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Further, in Liu’s view, the US return to Asia does not signal a break with
Washington’s China policy by any means, and American disquiet over
China’s rise might need to be seen in context. US security priorities lie else-
where, in Afghanistan and Iran, confronting Al-Qaeda and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. American geopolitical activism is focused on
the Middle East crisis, and Washington is not seeking to fashion a new se-
curity order in East Asia. In this sense, the grand US strategy consists of
preserving an upper hand in the international domain. Instead of counter-
ing the rising might of one country or another, it is more about refurbish-
ing American domination over international affairs.
After all, no East Asian country that is cosying up to the United States
has effected major changes to its China policy. The substantial cooperative
ties between China and South Korea have survived the considerable dete-
rioration to China’s image among South Koreans following the Cheonan in-
cident (in which 46 seamen died). Moves to set up an Asean+1 free trade
zone have not been stalled by Southeast Asian countries despite tensions
in the South China Sea. Even Japanese conservatives set store on mutually
beneficial cooperation with China. On the whole, the foreign policy of each
of China’s neighbours in East Asia remains independent, far from being
wholly subject to US interests. Rather, the countries seek to balance the
benefits they gain from the two superpowers active in the region.
In this scenario, Liu arrives at a positive conclusion. Until 2020, Chinese
foreign policy might continue riding on its “period of historic opportunity”
(戰略機遇期, zhanlue jiyuqi). Gao Zugui hardly differs, saying that it is
enough for China to make no changes to its dual policy strategy of good
neighbourliness and positive opening to Asian regionalism to continue
gaining strength in East Asia. In his view, the series of incidents in 2010 in
the Korean peninsula, around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and in the South
China Sea have rather underlined the shared responsibility of China and
the United States in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia.
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Violent incidents in Xinjiang appear to the Chinese to be proliferat-ing since 1990, especially after the media focus on the events ofJuly 2009 in Urumqi. Chinese analysts tend to highlight the events’
links to the internationalisation of pro-independence activism through the
“East Turkistan movement” (東突, Dongtu). This internationalisation theme
has a more general bearing on the issue of “three evil forces” (三股勢力) (6)
deemed to be growing in Xinjiang via transnational pro-East Turkistan or-
ganisations whose numbers have been expanding since the advent of eco-
nomic reforms in China. Xie Mengcen stresses the formation in the United
States in 2004 of two organisations that have emerged as beacons of the
political independence quest on the global scene: the “World Uyghur Con-
gress” (7) (世界維吾爾代表大會, shijie weiwu’er daibiao dahui) and the “East
Turkistan Government in Exile” (8) (東突厥斯坦流氓政府, dongtujuesitan li-
uwang zhengfu). Most articles on the internationalisation of the East Turk-
istan movement fail to mention Turkey, although a pan-Turkic ideological
basis (泛突厥主義, fan tujue zhuyi) is often attributed to these organisa-
tions. On the other hand, Sino-Turkish relations are constantly invoked in
discussions of Xinjiang. They stress Turkey’s position as one of the main
bases of the East-Turkistan movement. They particularly emphasise the
need for Ankara’s clear political support to China’s stand regarding Xin-
jiang. At the same time, they tend to show that it is through Sino-Turkish
collaboration on Xinjiang’s stability that Turkey could retain its influence
on Central Asia, where China’s importance is growing, especially after the
creation in 2001 of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), of
which Turkey is not a member.
Even after the establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1971,
China has been unable to improve its image among the Turks, as Zan Tao
observes. The Korean War, in which the Turkish army fought alongside the
Americans, left a negative impression of Chinese Communists in Turkey.
Also, Turkish nationalists have bristled at the support to Turkey’s extreme
leftists from the Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s. Bilateral relations
have developed mainly since the 1980s. It is only recently that Turkish
elites have taken note of China’s rising power, Zan notes. Then again, China
has yet to acquire the strategic importance that the United States, the
neighbouring European Union countries, Central Asia, or the Middle East
enjoy in Turkey’s eyes.
Meanwhile, Zan Tao as well as Zhu Xiang point out the eastward shift
(向 “東方,” xiang “dongfang”) in Turkish diplomatic focus since the end of
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the Cold War. Zan says this was because Turkey, which until then was
strategically important to the United States in the southern flank against
communism, receded in value and had to rethink its place in the interna-
tional system and develop relations with emerging countries. In Deng
Hongying’s view, this shift came about because of a more general disap-
pointment with Western powers apart from US ties. This was due both to
the European Union’s reluctance to admit Turkey while seeking to prevent
its getting too close to other Muslim countries and offering a “privileged
partnership” (特殊伙伴關係, teshu huoban guanxi), as well as due to the de-
terioration in ties with Israel following the raid on a Turkish flotilla in May
2010. At the same time, Turkey gradually became aware of China’s growing
importance on the international scene. As Deng Hongying points out,
there has been an “explosion” of bilateral commercial relations over the
last decade; two-way trade crossed the billion-dollar mark in 2000 and
rocketed to $12.6 billion in 2008. China emerged as the third largest ex-
porter to Turkey and its fourth largest trade partner. However, they’re un-
balanced; Zan underscores the lack of complementarity (Turkey exports
hardly any energy resources) and the pressure from Chinese products on
the Turkish market. In Zan’s view, this imbalance, along with the two coun-
tries’ lack of knowledge of each other (he notes the paltry study of Turkey
in China), constitute a potential factor for conflict.
Zan Tao and Zhu Xiang stress that in Chinese eyes, Turkey remains the
main external source of support for East-Turkistan movements. Zhu points
to the Turkish government’s rather vague role as regards the existence on its
soil of a dozen or so East-Turkistan organisations, with their own resources
and publication outlets. Zan sees a link between this laxness on the Turkish
leadership’s part and the ruling AKP or Justice and Development Party’s in-
ternational position of seeking rapprochement with Islamic countries. In
Zan’s view, the greatest implication for Turkey’s Muslim neighbours, espe-
cially given its growing interventions in the Iranian and Palestinian issues, is
a “Neo-Ottomanism” (新奧斯曼主義, xin aosiman zhuyi) in its foreign policy,
translated into a growing weight in the regions that were part of its former
empire. Zan and Zhu say that quite apart from trade matters, the Xinjiang
issue is central to the development of Sino-Turkish relations. Zan says there
is already some movement towards greater cooperation on this issue, given
Turkey’s growing awareness of China’s power. He notes there have been
statements to this effect, notably the signing on 14 February 2000 of a
Sino-Turkish agreement to jointly combat transnational crime.
Despite these moves towards greater cooperation, Zan perceives a persist-
ent anti-Chinese lobby in Turkey. According to this “radical line” (強硬派,
qiangying pai) representing economic nationalism (經濟民族主義, jingji
minzu zhuyi), Turkey would be a mere jumping-off point for China to get to
the European Union. In this regard he draws attention to the imbalance in
bilateral trade. Chinese warnings against Turkish interference in the Xinjiang
issue seem misplaced in Turkey’s eyes, as China has itself been intrusive in
matters that concern its interests, a good example being its support to leftist
groups in Turkey in the 1960s. It is in this context that Zan places the Turkish
prime minister’s criticism of the Chinese government over its handling of the
events of July 2009 in Urumqi. However, he remains confident as to the fu-
ture growth of Sino-Turkish relations: for some of the most “pragmatic” Turk-
ish leaders, the country has its own internal problems, especially the Kurdish
question, on which it needs China’s backing in international forums. More-
over, Turkey would be seeking to expand cooperation in military technolo-
gies, especially with regard to guided missiles.
Zan’s article tends to stress the flexibility of Turkey’s stand. According to
him, Ankara has yet to set out a clear and well-defined strategy regarding
China. Zhu Xiang, for his part, perceives a chequered history of bilateral re-
lations, times of friction alternating with coordination (摩擦－協調－摩擦,
moca–xietiao–moca). This lack of stability in relations is reflected in the two
sides’ approaches to the question of Central Asia, where Zhu sees them wa-
vering between coordination and competition (協調－競爭－協調, xietiao–
jingzheng–xietiao). He underlines the danger to Xinjiang’s stability stem-
ming from the Turkish strategy of accentuating the common cultural and
ethnic origins with Central Asian peoples in order to get close to countries in
the region. Zhu links this strategy to “two pans” – Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Turkism (雙泛, shuangfan). In general, Turkey certainly remains vague on the
regional question, but in Zan Tao’s view the tendency is towards collabora-
tion in Central Asia. After the Cold War, Turkey’s rising international stature
offers new opportunities to countries in the region in terms of investments,
energy export outlets, and so on. And now, given the increasing presence in
the region of China, which regards Central Asia as a frontline in the battle
against terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, as well as a source of
energy security, Turkey should be able to firm up its regional presence.
The formation of the SCO was a major step in China’s ascent in the region.
With China’s growing weight, the Xinjiang issue is gaining importance region-
ally. Among Chinese analysts, the tendency is to hold up the SCO as a guarantor
of Xinjiang’s stability, Wei Chaoran’s article being an example of this view. Con-
sequently the Turks have to face up to a greater need to cooperate with China.
Zan says that in order to meet China’s “needs,” Turkey could play a bridging role
between the East and the West and in the cooperation against terrorism and
for stability in Xinjiang. For China, this should lead Turkey towards cooperating
with the SCO on security issues. It follows from this that Turkey must clarify its
position on the Uyghur issue and ultimately work with China against the East-
Turkistan movements, in Zan’s view. Only thus can Turkey gain influence within
the SCO and obtain China’s support in other forums.
To sum up, Sino-Turkish relations are developing in the direction of in-
creased strategic cooperation. In October 2010, Turkey was the last leg of
Premier Wen Jiabao’s European tour. After meeting the Turkish leader
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Wen announced the development of cooperation on
strategic issues and stressed that bilateral ties were growing favourably.
Apart from forging closer economic ties – and with the “three evil forces”
in mind – it was resolved to maintain mutual support on issues of sover-
eignty and regional and national security. (9) In November 2010, Vice Pres-
ident Xi Jinping met Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The need
for collaboration in the fight against terrorism and separatism was noted
in the context of next year’s 40th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-
Turkish diplomatic relations. (10) Moreover, in October and November 2010,
the two countries held a joint military drill; it was China’s first such exer-
cise with a NATO member. (11) Thus Sino-Turkish relations are in a cooper-
ation phase, far from the events of 2009. However, as Zan emphasises, the
decade ahead will be a period for Turkey to build its strategic position with
regard to China, and many parameters hinging on the evolution of China’s
might are not yet clear.
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